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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 882 (1993) of 5 November 1993, which requested me to report on whether the Government of Mozambique and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) had made sufficient and tangible progress towards implementing the timetable concerning the major provisions of the general peace agreement for Mozambique signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome (see S/24635, annex). The Council requested me to report on the situation regarding the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), taking into consideration the need to achieve cost savings to the greatest extent possible, while remaining mindful of the importance of the effective discharge of the mandate.

2. My recommendations on the planned deployment of the ONUMOZ police contingent are contained in an addendum to the present report (S/1994/89/Add.1).

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DEMOBILIZATION OF TROOPS

A. General

3. A number of important developments have taken place since my report to the Council of 1 November 1993 (S/26666). Most importantly, the long-awaited assembly of troops began on 30 November 1993, and the dismantling of paramilitary forces, militia and irregular troops was initiated on 12 January 1994. The Electoral Law was approved by the Mozambican National Assembly on 9 December 1993, and the National Elections Commission was appointed on 21 January 1994. The National Commission for Administration, the National Police Affairs Commission and the Commission for Information were appointed on 17 November 1993. The President of Mozambique, Mr. Joaquim Chissano, and Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, President of RENAMO, who now maintains permanent residence in Maputo, have met on numerous occasions.

4. On several occasions the two leaders have successfully overcome deadlocked situations in the ongoing negotiations, and their cooperation has led to the timely implementation of many activities called for in the timetable. With the initiation of the cantonment of troops, the peace process has entered into a new phase. However, major problems still remain to be resolved in the immediate future. These include the opening of the remaining 14 assembly areas; initiation and subsequent completion of the actual demobilization; transfer of weapons from assembly areas to regional warehouses; dismantling of the paramilitary forces; provision of financial support for the transformation of RENAMO from a military movement into a political party; and formation of a well-functioning national defence force.

B. Assembly and demobilization of troops

5. Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 882 (1993) urged the parties to commence assembly of troops in November 1993 and to initiate demobilization by January 1994 with a view to ensuring the completion of the demobilization process by May 1994 in accordance with the timetable signed by the two parties in October 1993. On 30 November 1993, following a series of lengthy negotiations, troop cantonment formally commenced after the ratification by the Supervision and Monitoring Commission of the document entitled "Declaration regarding the opening of assembly areas pursuant to the general peace agreement for Mozambique". In accordance with the agreement, the initial 20 of the total 49 assembly areas were opened (12 for the Government and 8 for RENAMO), and the assembly of troops ensued. Fifteen additional assembly areas were opened on 20 December 1993. The opening of the remaining 14 sites, which was scheduled for 31 December 1993, has been delayed by a dispute between the two parties over control of the locations proposed for assembly areas in Salamanga and Dunda.

6. During the initial stages of cantonment, government troops assembled in much larger numbers than RENAMO troops. This trend was reversed by mid-December 1993. At this stage, RENAMO has assembled a much larger proportion of the total number of troops than the Government. As of 24 January 1994, 16,609 soldiers have checked into the assembly areas, 9,895 from the Government and 6,714 from RENAMO. This represents 30 per cent of the total number of soldiers expected in the 35 sites open, 22 per cent of the government soldiers and 58 per cent of RENAMO's soldiers. The current imbalance has grown significantly in January 1994, as only a limited number of government soldiers have arrived at the assembly areas during the first half of the month. Although there is evidence that the movement of government soldiers has quickened during the second half of January 1994, such movement is still not sufficient to achieve a better balance.

7. Arms collection has started in most assembly areas. In many cases, however, soldiers arrived in the assembly areas with less than one weapon per soldier on the average, and those weapons were often old and in poor condition. As of 24 January 1994, 11,382 government and 6,200 RENAMO weapons had been registered by ONUMOZ military observers. The transfer to regional warehouses of weapons collected in assembly areas has been delayed owing to political problems raised by the Government at the beginning of the process and subsequently by RENAMO. Storage-capacity for arms in the assembly areas is by now far exceeded,

leaving weapons to be stored at unsafe locations and placing at risk not only government and RENAMO soldiers but also United Nations personnel.

8. The movement of soldiers into the assembly area was planned to take place in stages, in careful coordination with the demobilization process, as most assembly areas have the capacity to accommodate only 30 to 50 per cent of the total number of troops at a time. The massive influx of RENAMO troops has led to overcrowding in some areas (almost 211 per cent of capacity at one camp), resulting in shortages of food and other essential items, inadequate lodging and storage facilities and potential health hazards. Delays in the selection of those soldiers who are to be demobilized and those who are to join the new army further prolong the stay of troops in the assembly areas, thus compounding already existing problems. Food shortages also occurred in assembly areas when the Government did not honour its commitment to supply these areas with dried meat, dried fish and salt. In order to resolve this problem, my Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello, sought support from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the donor community. As a result, WFP increased the rations of basic food items by an average of 25 per cent and the Swedish Government made available US$ 200,000 to cover the provision of the immediate meat and fish needs for the RENAMO assembly areas, while the Government confirmed its commitment to supplying its own assembly areas.

9. There have been a number of incidents of rioting by government soldiers in assembly areas and other locations over demands for back pay. These riots resulted in injuries and the death of two civilians. However, the incidents were resolved as soon as the Government provided the outstanding payments.

10. It was initially planned to provide civilian clothing to the demobilized soldiers at the time of their departure from the assembly areas, while the soldiers who would join the new army would have received only uniforms. However, most of the RENAMO soldiers arrived at the assembly areas literally dressed in rags and hence it became necessary to provide them with clothing at an earlier stage. The Italian Government helped to solve this problem by committing itself to provide civilian clothes for the Government and RENAMO troops who will be joining the new army. This allowed ONUMOZ to distribute clothes immediately to all the assembled RENAMO soldiers from the existing stocks of civilian clothes.

11. There have been delays in the dismantling of the militia and paramilitary forces, which was scheduled to begin simultaneously with assembly and demobilization of troops. There are approximately 155,600 government military and paramilitary troops in Mozambique, far outnumbering the approximately 80,000 regular government forces. After several attempts to set a deadline for the beginning of this process, the dismantling of the paramilitary groups was initiated on 12 January 1994. The Cease-fire Commission is overseeing the dismantling of the irregular armed groups. This process is very complex and extremely demanding logistically, as the armed elements are widely scattered throughout the country. In addition to the above, there are a total of 15,051 unassembled troops (14,734 for the Government and 317 for RENAMO) in Mozambique according to the information presented by the parties. These troops will not go through the assembly areas but will be demobilized at their present locations.

c. Preparation for elections

12. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 882 (1993), the Security Council once again reaffirmed the vital importance it attaches to the holding of elections no later than October 1994. In my previous report (S/26666), I informed the Security Council that agreements had been reached between the Government and RENAMO during my visit to Mozambique from 17 to 20 October 1993, which broke the deadlock on the issues of the composition and chairmanship of the National Elections Commission that had paralysed the debate on the draft electoral law. Subsequent discussions, however, reached an impasse over four other questions: (a) voting rights for expatriate Mozambicans; (b) composition of the provincial and district elections commissions; (c) composition of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration, which will be responsible for the organization of the electoral process; and (d) establishment and composition of an electoral tribunal to serve as final arbiter in all disputes arising from the electoral process.

13. On 26 November 1993, a consensus on the above questions was finally reached after a number of meetings were held between President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama in consultation with my Special Representative. It was agreed that:

(a) The National Elections Commission would decide whether it was feasible to organize polling for expatriate Mozambicans;

(b) The provincial and district elections commissions would have a chairperson appointed by the Government, a deputy chairperson appointed by RENAMO and one representative from other political parties, with the United Nations represented at the provincial level by two observers;

(c) The Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration would have a Director-General appointed by the Government and two deputy directors to be nominated by RENAMO and the other opposition parties, respectively. The staff of the Technical Secretariat will be composed of 50 per cent government, 25 per cent opposition and 25 per cent United Nations personnel;

(d) A five-member Electoral Tribunal would be established, composed of two Mozambican judges and three international judges proposed by the United Nations.

14. Following these agreements, the Electoral Law was approved by the Mozambican National Assembly on 9 December 1993, nine days later than envisaged in the timetable. It was promulgated by President Chissano shortly thereafter and entered into force on 12 January 1994. The members of the National Elections Commission were appointed on 21 January 1994 and are now in the process of selecting a suitable chairperson. The general peace agreement, in protocol III, paragraph 7 (a), prescribes that the National Elections Commission shall guarantee the distribution to all parties, without discrimination, of the available subsidies and logistic support for the election campaign. The establishment of a trust fund to support all parties in the electoral process is thus contingent on the functioning of the National Elections Commission.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Deployment of the military component

15. There have been no significant changes in the deployment of the ONUMOZ military elements since my last report to the Security Council (S/26666). The rotation of contingents from Argentina, Botswana, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Uruguay and Zambia was completed smoothly. As of 24 January 1994, against an authorized strength of 6,979, the total strength of the military component, including support elements, was 6,239, with contributions from the following countries:

Argentina	40
Bangladesh	1 433
Botswana	755
Brazil	3
India	919
Italy	1 022
Japan	53
Netherlands	11
Portugal	284
Uruguay	845
Zambia	874

The above figures include 22 military personnel from Bangladesh currently on loan to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and 1 in New York.

16. United Nations forces continued to carry out extensive operational activities throughout the country. The security of corridors and main roads is being ensured by regular road and aerial patrol as well as by vehicle and train escorts provided by United Nations forces. Furthermore, they are providing security to oil-pumping stations, airports, United Nations warehouses and ONUMOZ headquarters and, more recently, to temporary and permanent arms depots. United Nations forces are also contributing to humanitarian activities in the country by providing engineering and medical assistance. The engineer units continued to conduct road repair and improvement of water supply and were called in to assist in the rehabilitation of the training centres for the Mozambican Defence Force. The increased patrolling by United Nations troops has reduced the number and intensity of banditry incidents along the main routes, especially in the southern and central regions. On several occasions, United Nations armed units successfully negotiated solutions to situations of mutiny.

17. As of 24 January 1994, 330 of the authorized total of 354 military observers were deployed with ONUMOZ. The military observers continued to conduct inspections and investigations into allegations of cease-fire violations and assisted in the establishment and preparation of assembly areas. The observers have supervised the process of cantonment of troops since its inception, including the collection and storage of the weapons and ammunition handed over by government and RENAMO soldiers.

18. Ideally, it would be beneficial to keep much of the present United Nations formed units in Mozambique until the elections are held in October 1994. I am aware, however, of the additional costs associated with the establishment of the sizeable United Nations police presence in the country, which is recommended in my separate report on this matter (S/1994/89/Add.1). At the same time, I also believe that political developments in Mozambique have evolved in such a way as to allow an increasing shift of focus from cease-fire arrangements to general verification of police activities in the country and the respect of civil rights. But while the demobilization of troops is still proceeding, it would not be advisable to reduce the ONUMOZ military component significantly. In May 1994, when this phase will be nearly completed, I intend to begin a gradual cut-back of the Mission's military elements. The Mozambican Defence Force is scheduled to become fully operational by September 1994. By that time, the new Mozambican army will be expected to assume some of the major tasks in the transport corridors that are now performed by ONUMOZ. In my next progress report on ONUMOZ in April 1994, I intend to present to the Security Council reductions as well as estimates of corresponding cost savings.

B. Cease-fire

19. On several occasions in the past, the Council called on the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to respect fully all provisions of the general peace agreement, in particular those concerning the cease-fire and movement of troops. It will be recalled in this connection that the guidelines for movement of troops were signed by the two parties on 23 October 1993. These guidelines have helped the Cease-fire Commission to resolve several cases of cease-fire violations related to the unauthorized movement of troops. RENAMO was for quite some time reluctant to comply with the recommendations of the Cease-fire Commission on two cases, Dunda and Salamanga, involving movement of RENAMO troops after signature of the general peace agreement. This created complications for the approval of RENAMO assembly areas at these locations as the Government was unwilling to consider the sites until RENAMO's troops had withdrawn from them. RENAMO has now removed its soldiers from Dunda but a dispute remains about the required distance of withdrawal from Salamanga.

20. During the period under review, the Cease-fire Commission received 11 notifications of alleged cease-fire violations. These cases fell into three categories: (a) illegal detention of individuals; (b) alleged movement of troops; and (c) occupation of new positions. None of these violations constituted a serious threat to the cease-fire or to the peace process. Eight cases have been fully resolved and are considered closed. In two cases, the recommendations of the Cease-fire Commission are due to be implemented shortly, while the investigation results of the last case still has to be presented to the Commission.

C. Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

21. Some progress in this area has been made since I last reported to the Council. The training of the 540 instructors by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the training centre at Nyanga (Zimbabwe) was

completed by 20 December 1993, and these soldiers were then transported by ONUMOZ to the Dondo training centre in Mozambique on 12 January 1994. They will work with their United Kingdom instructors in training infantry soldiers at the three Mozambican Defence Force training centres. It has been agreed that most of the first group of 5,000 soldiers (half government and half RENAMO) will be transported directly from their present locations without passing through the assembly areas. The infantry training is scheduled to begin on 8 February 1994. The French training of one company of military engineers as well as the Portuguese training of three battalions of special forces and one company of marines and provision of training for senior military officers, logisticians and administrative personnel, which should have begun in November 1993, were delayed as a result of both political and technical problems. Meanwhile, the Supervision and Monitoring Commission approved a total of 19 documents relating to the organization, operating procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified armed forces and other matters. These documents had been elaborated by the Government and RENAMO with substantive assistance provided by Portugal.

22. The Government informed the donor community that it was not in a position to undertake the rehabilitation of the training centres for the new army. Despite the fact that the United Nations has no mandate in this area, my Special Representative intervened in order to speed up the process of the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, which are an essential element of the peace process. Mr. Ajello has offered all the logistical support that ONUMOZ could provide without incurring additional costs for the ONUMOZ budget and has sought options for funding among the donor community, should this be required. A task force, which included representatives from the Government, RENAMO, the three countries assisting in the formation of the new army (France, Portugal and United Kingdom) and ONUMOZ, was established by the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force to oversee and coordinate the rehabilitation of the training centres. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Government has undertaken to rehabilitate the three centres (Nacala, Catembe and Maputo) for the provision of training by the Portuguese. The Government of Italy has offered to provide $500,000 for the rehabilitation of the remaining training centres should this be required. However, the rehabilitation of the training centres by the Government is in progress, although slightly delayed.

III. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

23. The facilitation of the return and resettlement of demobilized soldiers into civilian life has been considered an important component of the humanitarian assistance programme, ever since the donors' meeting on Mozambique that was held in Rome in December 1992. Consequently, with the demobilization process well under way, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination is now focusing particular attention on its programme for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Through informal tripartite discussions within the Commission for Reintegration, it has been able to secure agreement on a three-pronged strategy that will address the needs of ex-soldiers. An aspect of this strategy deals with the identification of training opportunities within appropriate institutions in Mozambique. The strategy also includes a programme designed to promote self-employment through

the provision of occupational kits and credit to qualified persons. Additionally, the strategy seeks to identify employment opportunities in the public and private sectors and the possibility of providing where necessary subsidies to the concerned entities within these sectors, in order to enable them to accept quotas of demobilized soldiers. These three programme components will be tied to an information and referral service that will function at provincial and district levels. The existing provincial commissions for reintegration provide the institutional settings for the operation of such a service.

24. Since the capacity of the Mozambican economy to absorb thousands of new job-seekers leaving military duty is severely limited, donor agencies have been exploring ways and means to ease the problems that could confront ex-soldiers. This has resulted in a proposal to extend the Government severance payment to demobilized soldiers, in support of reintegration.

25. Progress with demobilization and agreement on an election date appear to have stimulated the rate of refugee repatriation and movement of internally displaced persons. It is now estimated that about half of the 4 to 4.5 million people displaced internally by war and drought have returned to their home areas. According to current reports, 621,000 persons or 40 per cent of the original refugee population, have left camps in neighbouring countries for their home districts in Mozambique, most of them spontaneously. Assisted repatriation organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has continued from Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as from Malawi, but this constitutes only a fraction of the entire movement of people. In mid-January 1994, the first organized repatriation of 208 refugees took place from South Africa, a cooperative effort of the South African authorities, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

26. Internally displaced persons and returning refugees make up the bulk of the beneficiaries of free distributions of food and non-food items such as seeds and tools. As may be expected in a year when the number of beneficiaries dropped markedly following a favourable crop season that produced agricultural surpluses in some areas, it has not always been possible to manage the pipeline for food donations without prices being affected in the local cereal markets. In order to counteract the possible negative effect of free food distribution on local production, several agencies have together purchased 62,000 tons of grain from the local market. For instance, WFP alone is making available resources for the purchase of 25,000 tons from local suppliers.

27. An update of the consolidated programme of humanitarian assistance to Mozambique was made public in November 1993. Its principal concerns are the repatriation of refugees, emergency relief of food and non-food items, as well as the restoration of essential services in rural areas where the returnees and displaced people are resettling. It also includes institutional support to Mozambican agencies responsible for emergency management. The revised estimates for priority needs now stand at $609.7 million, an increase of $50 million over a figure projected earlier. This is the result of an in-depth review of requirements in the health, education and road infrastructure sectors. Similarly, donor commitments for the same period have now reached $559.4 million, a most creditable response by the international community to

Mozambican post-war needs. Of this amount, $360.8 million, or 64 per cent, has been committed to special projects that are now in the implementation process.

28. Part of the resources made available by donors as voluntary contributions has been effected through the Trust Fund account established for Mozambique by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, mainly for programmes in the areas of demobilization, the reintegration of demobilized soldiers and demining operations, as well as for multisectoral area-based projects at district and community levels. At the end of December, cumulative pledges to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) trust funds stood at $33 million, of which $28 million has been paid in. Project allocations from the trust funds total $20 million, an increase of $15 million since the end of October 1993.

29. Reports on 8 mine accidents since November 1993, recording 21 dead and 15 injured, clearly show that mines continue to pose serious threats to the civilian population. Following an intensive series of tripartite meetings, the national mine clearance plan of Mozambique was finally approved in December 1993 by the Cease-fire Commission. In order to set priorities for demining, a national mine survey is now being carried out by a British non-governmental organization (NGO) and this will, within approximately four months, provide high-quality information on mined roads and areas all over the country. As regards mine clearance, two additional demining efforts are about to become operational, one in the province of Sofala financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and a second in the province of Zambézia funded by the United Kingdom. This brings to four the number of mine clearance operations now in progress in Mozambique. Contract award is imminent for a fifth project financed jointly from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Trust Fund and the ONUMOZ budget. In addition, the ONUMOZ mine clearance training centre, located in Beira, started its first course for 32 Mozambican trainees in mid-January 1994. Four demining teams, financed by the European Union, continue to clear the road from Caia to Chemba along the Zambezi river, from Gorongosa to Casa Banana and from Dombe towards Espungabera. Mine clearance in the Mutarara district of Tete Province is continuing by a Norwegian NGO with a team of Mozambican deminers that has recently been increased from 64 to 89 persons.

30. At its meeting on 22 December 1993, the Monitoring and Supervisory Commission decided to reactivate the Humanitarian Assistance Committee, which was established on 16 July 1992 under the declaration of principles guiding the provision of humanitarian assistance to Mozambique (see S/24635, annex). In accordance with the general peace agreement, the future of this Committee, which was chaired by the United Nations, was to be decided in the light of developments, but several subcommittees continued to function as needed. The reactivation of the Committee will now allow these activities to be carried out under a more formal structure.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

31. Significant progress has been made since my last report to the Council (S/26666). However, several serious problems relating to the implementation of the general peace agreement still remain to be addressed by all concerned.

32. The demobilization of the government and RENAMO troops, totalling more than 80,000 soldiers, presents a great challenge to the Mozambican economy and the peace process in the country. For the demobilized soldiers not to become a source of instability, they must have viable economic opportunities, while the troops joining the new army must be incorporated into a well-functioning institution. It should be also emphasized that the success of the proposed reintegration support programme for demobilized soldiers, to be conducted under United Nations auspices, will be entirely dependent upon the generous financial support of the international community.

33. Owing to the hardship of Mozambican army life and to the history of late or non-payment of salaries, it appears that not many soldiers are interested in joining the Mozambican Defence Force at present. In order to attract soldiers to the new army, provision will have to be made for satisfactory conditions of service, including adequate salary, an acceptable quality and quantity of food and decent accommodation. Unless these conditions are met, it would be difficult to expect that the parties would manage to provide the 30,000 personnel envisaged for the new army. I would therefore urge the Government of Mozambique to provide adequate facilities and resources for the soldiers in the Mozambican Defence Force in order to ensure the success of the formation of the new army, which is considered to be an essential element in the implementation of the general peace agreement.

34. The lack of resources available for the transformation of RENAMO into a political party also poses a threat to the peace process. At this stage, the problem has acquired a special dimension and, if left unresolved, could place the peace process in jeopardy. According to protocol III, section 7, of the general peace agreement, RENAMO is entitled to receive the financial assistance necessary to transform itself into a political party. As the Security Council is aware, the Government of Mozambique requested, through the United Nations, the support of the international community to make available the required financial resources. A United Nations-administered trust fund for a projected $10 million has been established.

35. Although this Trust Fund has alleviated some of the administrative and logistic requirements related to RENAMO's participation in the implementation of the provisions of the general peace agreement, it has not entirely solved the problem. The resources currently available are clearly not sufficient. An amount of at least $15 million is needed, as opposed to the $7.5 million currently available. Furthermore, as I indicated in my last report, there are expenditures associated with the transformation of RENAMO into a political party that cannot be easily met through a United Nations-administered Fund, on account of the rules and procedures that govern their use. In close consultation with my Special Representative and members of the donor community, I am presently exploring the possibility of setting up a more flexible funding mechanism. It is envisaged that, subject to the scrupulous and timely implementation of the general peace agreement, an appropriate monthly allowance would be provided to RENAMO under this new mechanism.

36. I am confident that, at this important juncture in the peace process, the United Nations will continue to do its utmost to assist the people of Mozambique. However, in the final analysis, it is the Mozambicans themselves

who bear the main responsibility for the success of the implementation of the general peace agreement. The timetable for implementation of the agreement is becoming increasingly tight. It is imperative that the two parties honour their commitments and cooperate closely with the United Nations in overcoming existing obstacles. I trust that the Mozambicans and their leaders are fully aware that the international community will be increasingly reluctant to continue to support this process in the event of further delays.